This essay examines the 1960s/1970s' transformation of the text as an object of reading, and argues for an equivalent transformation of philology as a practice of reading. I focus on the oscillation between reading as literacy (the capacity to recognize and decipher a given language) and reading as interpretation (the capacity to respond to the text). This oscillation itself results from an irreducible ambiguity in the text: both a stable verbal artifact with a determinable form and a bearer of indeterminate meaning. Reading Roland Barthes's critique of philology and Ursula Le Guin's science-fictional paean to its possibilities ('The Author of the Acacia Seeds'), I argue for a philological practice that resists, questions, and repositions the closure of the text. 
et nous sommes bien d'accord: tout cela n'est pas aisé, on a bien raison de répéter le mot… Nous chantons le Kirie eleison avec ferveur… Et cependant nous nous demandons ce que viennent faire toutes ces charrettes dans la célébration de la messe. C'est que nous entendons dans nos oreilles Kirri eleiz 'so (il y a des tas de charrettes) sans jamais voir la couleur d'une seule d'entre elles. (Hélias, 1995, 133; cited in Waquet, 1998, 128) [We… try to link this church Breton with our everyday Breton through the occasional words floating on the Latin music that seem to be our own. That is why we give our total assent to the Dies irae, dies illa. In
Breton diez means difficult and we quite agree: all this is far from easy, we have every reason to repeat the word… We sing the Kyrie eleison with great fervour… But we still wonder what all those carts have to do with the celebration of mass. Our ears hear Kirri eleiz 'so (there are heaps of carts), but we never see the colour of a single one. (Waquet, 2001, 104-5)] Traditionally, a philologist would see Hélias's response to the Mass as a simple incapacity to read. Undeniably, Hélias and his friends do fail to register the otherness of the language. But they do not fail to make sense of the text: as Waquet points out, they succeed in 'traduisant dans des mots intelligibles une réalité que la barrière linguistique… transformait en de pures manifestations sonores' (Waquet, 1998, 128) ('translating into intelligible words a reality whose literal meaning the linguistic barrier has… transformed into mere sounds' [Waquet, 2001, 104] ). Some might see this Latin-Breton translation as just the kind of 'simple… error' that Pollock invokes in suggesting that 'not all interpretations are worthy of philological attention to the same degree' (Pollock, 2014) . I see it rather as a limit-case, capable of clarifying our notions of reading and of 'making sense. ' Pollock argues that all interpretations are worthy of attention to the extent that they 'tell us about the text and the properties the text possesses that might have prompted this or that interpretation' (Pollock, 2014 ).
Hélias's reading has little to tell us about the properties of the Latin mass (although, as Sarah Kay pointed out in her response to this paper at the conference 'Philology/Humanism' at Dartmouth College in October 2013, it may tell us about Hélias's fantasies: about peasant apprehension of the world as concrete rather than abstract and about his not being in need of divine mercy [Kay, 2013] ). It has a great deal to tell us, however, about 'the text' conceived abstractly, as the disciplinary object of philology.
In its detailed narration of a concrete practice of making sense of a text that one cannot read, this example exacerbates to the highest degree possible the ambiguity in the idea of reading as making sense of a text. This ambiguity arises directly from a doubleness or split in the nature of the text as meaning-bearing object: meaning is both an indissociable property of a sign and a new artifact created by the productive activity of a reader. Hélias's account of 'hearing' the Latin Mass in Breton takes the difference between these two meanings to an extreme: as a sign in the system of the Latin language, the word dies does not mean 'difficult'; to Hélias and his friends, it does. This discrepancy poses sharply the question of the relationship between the text understood as a stable verbal artifact (a language with a fixed and knowable set of conventions) and the text as a bearer of meaning (requiring interpretation and producing multiple --even conflicting --senses).
These texts --verbal artifact, bearer of meaning --are neither one nor two: they can neither be entirely conflated nor entirely distinguished. The history of philology can be understood as the history of negotiating with this irresolvable ambiguity at the heart of its object, the text. This essay examines one particularly transformative moment in the history of philology in the Western world: the 1960s and 1970s. The work of the Tel Quel group in this period resignified the very word 'text,' thereby (at least potentially) transforming the disciplinary object of philology.
At the same time, postcolonial studies and the second wave of feminism also began transforming the relationship between texts and sense-making practices. Textual studies has absorbed the transformations of the 1960s/70s thoroughly, but not always consciously, and hence not always effectively ('the more present to our consciousness this discipline of sense-making becomes, the more effective it becomes' [Pollock, 2014] ). In this essay, I return to the moment of transformation in order to make present to our consciousness what was at stake then, and now, in making sense of a text.
One elegantly simple, but ultimately untenable, solution to the text's ambiguity proposed in the 1970s is George Steiner's (After Babel). Steiner resolves the problem by wholly conflating the text as bearer of meaning with the text as verbal artefact, arguing that reading as 'making sense' simply is literacy. Texts from different historical periods are already in different, self-contained languages. As soon as there is a temporal gap between text and reader 'it is, literally, as if a language had been lost' (Steiner, 1975, 15 ). An English word whose meaning has changed between the moment of the text's production and the moment of its reception should be understood not as the same word appearing in two different contexts, but as a homonym or 'false friend' in a different language:
The time-barrier may be more intractable than linguistic difference. Any bilingual translator is acquainted with the phenomenon of 'false friends' --homonyms such as French habit and English habit which on occasion might, but almost never do, have the same meaning, or mutually untranslatable cognates such as English home and German Heim. The translator within has to cope with subtler treasons. (Steiner, 1975, 28) Specialist vocabularies (such as those of falconry or navigation) are also troped as languages (Steiner, 1975, 25) , and the historical-contextual materials to which Steiner's reader turns in order to situate a text and produce a reading of it are troped as 'dictionaries' or 'glossaries' (Steiner, 1975, 24) . Historical context is not 'context' as opposed to 'text'; rather, Steiner writes, 'a text is embedded in specific historical time' (Steiner, 1975, 24) , so that 'if they occur in temporal sequence, no two statements are perfectly identical' (Steiner, 1975, 18) . Steiner, like the unnamed narrator of Borges's 'Pierre Menard, autor del Quijote,' posits the possibility of the existence of two texts which are 'verbalmente idénticos' ('verbally identical') but nonetheless different (Borges, 1999, 52; 1962, 52 Pour qu'il y ait science nouvelle, il ne suffit pas en effet que la science ancienne s'approfondisse ou s'étende… il faut qu'il y ait rencontre d'épistémés différentes… et que cette rencontre produise un objet nouveau (il ne s'agit plus de l'approche nouvelle et d'un objet ancien); c'est en l'occurrence cet objet nouveau que l'on appelle texte. (Barthes, 1994c (Barthes, , 1679 For there to be a new science it is not enough, in effect, for the old science to become deeper or wider… there has to be a meeting of new epistemes… and this meeting has to produce a new object (it is no longer a question of a new approach to an old object): in the event it is this new object that we call text. (Barthes, 1981, 35) This new object, however, has the same name as an old object --indeed, the same name as the old object against which it defines itself. In Barthes's essay, the new object, 'text' (the semiological text), is defined in opposition to the philological text.
The use of the same word for the two different objects is a new strategy for Barthes.
Two years earlier, in 'De l'oeuvre au texte' ('From Work to Text'), he had differentiated the 'objet nouveau' (the 'new object') (Barthes, 1994b (Barthes, , 1211 , the text, from the work, with philology on the side of the work (oeuvre) (Barthes, 1994b (Barthes, , 1213 1989a, 58) . There is, then, something strategic at stake in the move to name both the old and the new object by the same word, 'text.' 3 This strategy could be seen as performative, in that it calls attention to the irreducible possibility of doubled (or plural) meaning that, as we shall see, distinguishes the semiological from the philological.
Barthes explains the difference between the semiological and the philological text most clearly in his 1973 entry in Encyclopaedia Universalis, 'Texte (théorie du)'
('Theory of the Text'). He argues that 'l'ancien texte des philologues' ('the old [text] , that of the philologists') (Barthes, 1994c (Barthes, , 1678 1981, 34) conflates the stability of the text as meaning bearer with the fixity of the text as verbal artefact:
l'exactitude littérale de l'écrit… se confond métonymiquement avec son exactitude sémantique: dans l'univers classique de la loi du signifiant, se déduit une loi du signifié (et réciproquement); les deux légalités coïncident, se consacrent l'une l'autre: la littéralité du texte se trouve dépositaire de son origine, de son intention et d'un sens canonique qu'il s'agit de maintenir ou de retrouver. (Barthes, 1994c (Barthes, , 1678 [the literal exactitude of the written… is metonymically confused with its semantic exactitude. In the classical universe, a law of the signified is deduced from the law of the signifier, and vice versa. The two legalities coincide, and each confirms the other: the literality of the text is made the repository of its origin, of its intention, and of a canonical meaning, which has to be maintained or rediscovered. (Barthes, 1981, 33 (Derrida, 1972, 387; emphasis original) [Does the generality of the risk [of infelicity]… surround language like a kind of ditch, a place of external perdition into which locution might never venture, that it might avoid by remaining at home…? Or indeed is this risk, on the contrary, its internal and positive condition of possibility? this outside its inside? the very force and law of its emergence? (Derrida, 1982, 325)] In the same essay, Derrida, echoing Barthes's emphasis on the 'wandering' of meaning, argues that:
il appartient au signe d'être en droit lisible… même si je ne sais pas ce que son prétendu auteur-scripteur a voulu dire en conscience et en intention au moment où il l'a écrit, c'est-à-dire abandonné à sa dérive essentielle. (Derrida, 1972, 377) [by all rights, it belongs to the sign to be legible… even if I do not know what its alleged author-scriptor meant consciously and intentionally at the moment he wrote it, that is abandoned it to its essential drifting. (Derrida, 1982, 317)] Where classical philology constructed the text as fixed, for both Derrida and Barthes its essential properties are wandering, drifting, trembling, and doubleness. The risks to meaning that 'les philologues' attempt to ward off are, then, precisely what constitute the text in the first place; their work is only the belated attempt to close, arrest, contain, and resist the 'dérive essentielle' ('essential drifting') of writing and the disseminative force of textuality. The text that functions as the 'origin' of meaning is produced as origin and as legitimating ground by a specific set of philological practices, of which it is, however, not the cause but the effect.
This arrest of meaning, Barthes explains, is achieved through the insistence on a specific set of rules for reading, which are designed to produce (Barthes's philologists would say 'maintain' or 'rediscover') a single meaning:
Le texte est le nom de l'oeuvre, en tant qu'elle est habitée par un sens et un seul, un sens 'vrai', un sens définitif; il est cet 'instrument' scientifique qui définit autoritairement les règles d'une lecture éternelle. (Barthes, 1994c (Barthes, , 1678 [The [philological] text is the name of the work in so far as it is inhabited by one, and only one, meaning, a 'true' meaning, a 'definitive' meaning. It is that scientific 'instrument' which defines in an authoritarian way the rules of an eternal reading. (Barthes, 1981, 33 )]
The problem is not that the philological 'lecture éternelle' requires rules; it is impossible to read without rules, as Barthes demonstrates in his 1970 essay 'Écrire la lecture' (Writing Reading) (Barthes, 1994a, 962; 1989b, 31) . Rather, the problem arises when one does not acknowledge these 'rules' as ludic. In the classical universe of the philological text, the rules for reading are instead 'authoritarian,' that is, complicit with extratextual (institutional, ideological) forms of authority. These nonludic, authoritarian rules have two functions. First, they close the text on a singular meaning; second, they erase any signs that this closing is an intervention in the textual field, instead constructing closure as an 'ontologically grounded formal property' of the text (Mowitt, 1992, 8 (Steiner, 1975, 24 (Barthes, 1994a (Barthes, , 961: 1989b . He argues that:
[la] logique du symbole… n'est pas déductive mais associative: elle associe au texte matériel… d'autres idées, d'autres images, d'autres significations. 'Le texte, le texte seul', nous dit-on, mais le texte seul ça n'existe pas: il y a immédiatement dans cette nouvelle, ce roman, ce poème que je lis, un supplément de sens, dont ni le dictionnaire ni la grammaire ne peuvent rendre compte. (Barthes, 1994a, 962) [ [Barthes, 1994a, 962; 1989b, 30] (Barthes, 1994c (Barthes, , 1677 1981, 32 ). This 'current opinion' --myth or ideology --is much more often opposed to the semiological text. Philology opposes the semiological text only insofar as it is complicit with ideology: indeed, as Sarah Kay has pointed out, in this period Barthes avails himself enthusiastically of many of the traditional resources of philology, notably historical linguistics (Kay, 2013) . 4 We might well ask, then, whether everything that goes by the name of 'philology' is necessarily ideological. In the climate of political hostility to philology traced by Carolyn Dinshaw in Getting Medieval (Dinshaw, 1999, 173-182) , the claim that the 'labor-intensive, preindustrial, artisanal craft' of philology (Pollock, 2009, 945 ) is complicit with the ideology of contemporary capitalism looks increasingly less sustainable. Michelle Warren, similarly, makes a convincing case for the detailed, attentive readings of philology as 'an active participant in the disruption of hegemonic discourses' (Warren, 2003, 23) : philological techniques can be used against the 'authoritarian rules' which would disingenuously close down the text. In this light, Pollock's 'philology in three dimensions' clearly has as its object not 'l'ancien texte des philologues' but Barthes's semiological text. Like Barthes, Pollock critiques the 'ideology of the singular meaning' (Pollock, 2009, 955) and argues that one 'plane' of philological reading must be the subjectivity, and the pleasure, of the reader: in making sense of texts, we must 'try to make sense of this "pleasure," or whatever it
[is] the work afford[s] me' (Pollock, 2014 ; emphasis added). Subjectivity and pleasure are the very dimensions of reading that Barthes opposes to the philological text in 'Texte (théorie du)', via the binary distinction between 'signification' (on the side of philology) and 'signifiance' (on the side of semiology). 'Signifiance' is defined by its relation to jouissance --pleasure, bliss --and by subjective engagement with the text:
'[il] place le sujet (de l'écrivain, du lecteur) dans le texte' ('it puts the (writing or reading) subject into the text') (Barthes, 199c, 1692; 1981, 38) . . (Barthes, 1973a, 26-27) [Its members would have nothing in common (for there is no necessary agreement on the texts of pleasure) but their enemies: fools of all kinds, who decree foreclosure of the text and of its pleasure... Such a society would have no site, would function only in total atopia; yet it would be a kind of phalanstery, for in it contradictions would be acknowledged (and the risks of ideological imposture thereby restricted), difference would be observed, and conflict rendered insignificant (being unproductive of pleasure). (Barthes, 1975, 14-15) (Hamacher, 2010, 9; 2009, 26) .
I opened this paper with an example of reading in the 'wrong' language, Hélias's reading of the Latin Mass in Breton, as a creative and productive practice of making sense of a text. I argued that this practice succeeded in constructing the 'mere sounds' of the Latin mass as a text, and that far from being an example of a simple misunderstanding 'lower in the philological scale of value than other' interpretations
The first extract concerns the interpretation of an Ant text 'written in touchgland exudation on degerminated acacia seeds' (Le Guin, [1974 ] 1983 . This text, although profoundly alien, is at least 'written' in a relatively familiar way: it is the product of an individual author and it exists as a specific arrangement of markings on material objects (the acacia seeds). Moreover, although it presents difficulties of interpretation, these are of a relatively familiar kind. The debate in this extract is over the valency of the word 'up' in the phrase 'Up with the Queen!' on Seed 31: 'to us, "up" is a "good" direction… Not necessarily so to an ant' (Le Guin, [1974 ] 1983 ).
In the second extract, we move to languages written by groups, rather than by single authors, and, even more strangely to us, 'written' in movement through air and water ('in wings, neck and air') rather than in durable markings on a solid surface:
It was Professor Duby who, by pointing out the remote affiliation of the script with Low Greylag, made possible the first tentative glossary of Penguin… Indeed, it seemed strange that a script written almost entirely in wings, neck and air should prove the key to the poetry of short-necked, flipper-winged water-writers. But we should not have found it so strange if we had kept in mind the fact that penguins are, despite all evidence to the contrary, birds… that they do not swim but fly in water. (Le Guin, [1974 ] 1983 This extract describes 'the difficulty of translation' in relation to the 'group kinetic texts' written by penguins (Le Guin, [1974] 1983, 6-7).
The final extract, the Editorial, goes yet further, sketching the difficulties, and speculating about the possibilities, of learning how to read scripts and languages beyond the animal: 'We have not yet lifted our eyes to the vaster horizons before us.
We have not faced the almost terrifying challenge of the Plant' (Le Guin, [1974 Guin, [ ] 1983 No extra-terrestrial species, languages, or locations are invoked; no new technologies are mentioned. We see 'the underwater motion-picture camera' (Le Guin, [1974] 1983, 5-6), 'time-lapse photography' (Le Guin, [1974 Guin, [ ] 1983 , and a hiker with a rucksack (Le Guin, [1974] 1983, 10), none of which are recent even in 1974. The
Editorial links the passing of time to human progress, but this progress is measured solely by the achievements of therolinguists and their imagined future counterparts, phytolinguists and geolinguists. The science-fictional adventure and the narrative of human history are shown to consist in learning to be better readers of texts, and being a better reader consists of being a less ethnocentric reader. A better reader is more open to otherness, more able to recognize and appreciate texts with which she does not share common assumptions, more able to read in ways that resist the 'authoritarian rules' of ideology, ethnocentrism, anthropocentrism, and paronthocentrism (presentcenteredness, 'the historical equivalent of phallocentrism and ethnocentrism,' which 'undermines the possibility of understanding the present's historical other: the past' [Bal, 1999, 19] ). Le Guin's story stages the ways in which the resources of philology can be put, not to ideological, but to utopian ends.
Barthes writes that the Society of the Friends of the Text would or could exist only in total atopia --'une sorte de phalanstère' ('a sort of phalanstery'), that is, the sort of ideal, co-operative community imagined by Charles Fourier. This atopia, then, is also a utopia. Theory of textuality elaborated by the Tel Quel group, as Mowitt shows, has a necessary relationship to utopia. If 'the closure of the text is coordinated with the socially constructed perception of its limits' (Mowitt, 1992, 8) , and if philology is what resists the text's foreclosure --that is, resists, questions, and
repositions the text's socially constructed boundary --then philology opens the text onto 'what as yet, has no place within the social' (Mowitt, 1992, 17) . Le Guin stages precisely this philological operation, as her therolinguists refuse to accept the socially constructed perception of the limits of textuality. They practice a future-oriented, utopian philology, accommodating that which has no place within the social (the languages, texts, and art of insects, birds, plants, and minerals); they insist on the possibility of change in the social institutions and cultural assumptions according to which we read.
Comment [MS2]: source information?
These changes become possible, Le Guin's story tells us, by learning to see familiar objects as texts. Although they appear at first sight to occupy opposite ends of a philological spectrum, Le Guin's therolinguists meet here with Hélias's Breton children. Both groups of readers succeed in making sense of objects which a linguistic barrier has transformed into meaningless things: the words of Latin mass, the arrangement of degerminated acacia seeds, the movement of penguin necks and wings through air, the lichen on Pike's Peak, the rocks of the peak itself. Both Hélias's children and Le Guin's therolinguists succeed in making sense of texts, and both do so 
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